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NOTES
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF
ACCESS TO MIGRANT LABOR CAMPS AFTER
LLOYD CORPORATION v. TANNER
The plight of the migrant farm worker has recently been
brought to public attention. Migrants are among the most ill-nour-
ished, 1 ill-housed,2 and poorly educated3 workers in America. Mi-
grants are isolated from their countrymen in labor camps.4 They
work long hours5 at back-breaking labor 6 for very low wages.7
1 One observer of migrant conditions has described the standard meals at a migrant
camp in Florida:
For dinner we had rice, baked beans, corn bread and some kind of fatty cut from a
pig, all soaked in gravy. For lunch, as usual, we had a peanut-butter sandwich, a
lunch-meat sandwich, and two cookies. Sometimes, when there is not a full day's
work, we get only two meals a day.
W. FRIEDLAND & D. NELKIN, MIGRANT: AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN AMERICA'S NORTHEAST 45
(1971) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDLAND & NELKIN].
2 See Hearings ofSubcomm. onMigratoryLabor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare of the
United States Senate on Farm Worker Powerlessness, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 5653-5824 (1970),
for a summary of the farm-labor housing problem. In Michigan, for instance, investigators
found that 45% of the camps surveyed had defective drainage; 35% had either insufficient or
unsafe water supplies; 46% of the houses in the camps had no place to hang clothing.
Thirty-two percent of the homes had no bathing facilities; 62% of the camps had unsanitary
toilets; 70% of the units in the camp were overcrowded. In 39% of the camp units children
slept in the same room with their parents. This latter figure was a bright spot-in four states,
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Washington, 74% of the homes had children and parents
sleeping in the same room. Id. at 5690-91.
3 A conversation with a migrant worker reported by one observer shows both the
migrants' aspiration for education and their realistic chances to obtain it.
I asked Ann what she wanted her three youngest children to be, and she said that she
hoped the boy would be a doctor.... A little later in the conversation I phrased my
question a little differently: "What do you think they will be?" Her answer. . . "Cherry
pickers."
FRIEDLAND & NELKIN 253. One writer has estimated that as few as one migrant child in 50
enters high school and that fewer graduate. See M. REUL, TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF RURAL
POVERTY 477-78 (1974).
4 See note 2 supra.
5 Picking and harvesting require very long hours of work, but the migrants' remunera-
tion for the work they do is very low. See note 7 infra; see FRIEDLAND & NELKIN 70-96 for a
description of migrant work patterns.
6 Union organizers complain that conditions in the field destroy the health of the
workers. One complaint, for instance, centers on the use of pesticides on the crops that are
harvested. C~sar Chavez, leader of the United Farm Workers union, estimates that 80% of all
migrants in California suffer ill-effects from pesticides. The U.F.W. has sought to incorporate
limitations on pesticide use into union contracts with growers. See J. LONDON & H. ANDEIRSON,
So SHALL YE REAP: THE STORY OF CESAR CHAVEZ & THE FARM WORKERS' MOVEMENT 162-63
(1971).
A strawberry picker, for instance, in 1969-70, working at top speed, made no more than
$9 a day in Florida. For hoeing and weeding crops, the hardest type of agricultural labor,
Florida migrants were paid between $1 and $1.25 an hour. See FRIEDLAND & NELKIN 90-91.
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Housing in migrant camps often barely meets minimum health
standards.8 The harvest which the migrants bring in is a "[h]arvest
of shame."9
Those who seek to provide social services to the migrants, or to
organize them into unions, 10 have met fierce resistance from the
farmers who employ the migrants." This clash of interests has
occurred in many contexts.' 2 Outsiders who have sought to reach
the migrants in their labor-camp homes have been arrested for
violating state trespass laws.' 3 These arrests and threats of arrest
have occasioned much litigation.' 4 Social workers and union or-
ganizers have argued that their right to see the migrants is pro-
tected by the first amendment.' 5 In turn, camp owners have as-
serted that their rights as owners of the migrant camps allows them
to eject trespassers.'
6
In weighing these conflicting interests, courts have almost
unanimously held in favor of a right of entry.' 7 Different rationales
have been used to reach the same result. At least three distinct lines
of reasoning can be discerned in the cases upholding a right of
8 See note 2 supra.
The phrase was first used in a 1960 CBS television documentary narrated by Edward R.
Murrow. See Hearings on Farm Worker Powerlessness Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
10 For an account of the efforts of the United Farm Workers to organize migrants into
unions, see P. MATTrHIESSEN, SAL SI PUEDES: C-SAR CHAVEZ AND THE NEw AMERICAN REVO-
LUTION (rev. ed. 1971). '
11 See id.; J. LONDON & H. ANDERSON, supra note 6. Both books contain detailed accounts
of the jockeying between camp owners on the one hand, and priests, union organizers, and
social workers on the other, over wages, working conditions, and access to the camps.
12 See note I I and accompanying text supra.
13 See, e.g., Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Franceschina
v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972). All of the cases discussed in the text of this Note
involved situations where arrests for trespass had been made or threatened. See also N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1975, at 36, col. 2, for a report on the threats of arrest made by farmers in
California's current controversy over access to migrant camps.
14 See, e.g., Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1975, at 24, col. 1.
11 See Asociacion de Trabajadores v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975), where
the plaintiffs chose to argue their case solely on first amendment grounds. Id. at 2. This first
amendment approach, as this Note will show, is not the only route available to those seeking
access.
l The use of the property-rights argument continually arises in outsider-versus-camp
owner legal confrontations. For one example of how the argument has been used in recent
California litigation, see the report in the N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1975, at 36, col. 2.
1" See Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975);
Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Velez v. Amento, 370 F. Supp.
1250 (D. Conn. 1974); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras
v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369
(1971); People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga Co. Ct. 1971); contra
Asociacion de Trabajadores A.gricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975).
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access. One rationale proceeds from the premise that migrants are
de facto tenants with all the rights of tenancy.' 8 A second rationale
proposed by the courts argues that only certain interests in land are
worthy of protection from trespass.' 9 A third line of judicial rea-
soning labels the migrant camps "company towns" with the result
that parties seeking entry are protected by the first amendment.
These courts rely on the line of first amendment cases beginning
with Marsh v. Alabama.20 All three rationales avoid dealing with the
standards for balancing first amendment rights and property rights
developed in Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner.
2'
In Lloyd, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for
determining when first amendment rights would outweigh prop-
erty rights so as to justify trespass on private land. First amend-
ment rights would take precedence over property rights, the Lloyd
Court stated, only when: (1) the property in question served a
public or quasi-public function; 22 (2) the message of those seeking
first amendment protection was reasonably related to the public
use to which the property had been put;2 3 and (3) no adequate
18 See, e.g., Franceschina v. Morgan, 356 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v.
Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
19 State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
20 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup
Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975); Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.
1973); People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga Co. Ct. 1971).
21 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Lloyd has been the subject of some scathing commentary in the law
reviews. See, e.g., Recent Development, Expression of First Amendment Rights in the Privately-
Owned Shopping Center, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 807 (1971); Note, The Demise of Logan Valley and the
Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973); 57 MINN. L. REv. 603 (1972).
22 407 U.S. at 562-63, 569-70. Whether private property has assumed a public function
seems, under one reading of Lloyd, to be a threshold question on the issue of state action.
Thus, a parcel of private property must be dedicated to a public function before any balancing
of free-speech rights with property rights can occur. Id. at 567. Exactly when private land
assumes a public function is never clearly answered in Lloyd; rather, Justice Powell, writing for
the Court, provides only sketchy guidelines:
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally
invited to use it for designated purposes.... Nor is size alone the controlling factor.
... This is not to say that no differences may exist with respect to governmental
regulation or rights of citizens arising by virtue of the size and diversity of activities
carried on within a privately owned facility serving the public.... We do say that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners, as well as the
First Amendment rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected.
Id. at 569-70.
23 Id. at 563. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the relatedness of an
activity to the use to which land had been put should bejudged in light of past uses of the land
and not in light of the "normal" uses of the land. He argued that the Lloyd Corporation had
permitted political organizations to use their shopping center for political purposes in the
past; thus, he maintained, the corporation could not argue that the activity of Viet Nam war
protesters was unrelated to the use to which the land had been put, even though the land was
normally used for nonpolitical, commercial purposes. Id. at 579 (dissenting opinion, Marshall,
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alternative means of communication that did not require trespass
existed.24
The Lloyd tests pose many potential difficulies for those assert-
ing a "right" to enter migrant camps. For instance, camp owners
can argue that alternative means of communication are easily avail-
able to reach migrants. 25 They may claim that the message sought
to be conveyed by some outsiders is in no way related to the public
function of the camp.26 Camp owners can also argue that their
camps serve no quasi-public functions. Were the camp owners to
prevail on any one of these arguments, under Lloyd, the claim of
those seeking entry would be defeated.28
Can the Lloyd test be avoided in the migrant camp situation?
Does a rationale that avoids Lloyd satisfactorily protect the interests
of the migrants? If it does not, can other rationales be offered that
would provide more protection? Finally, if Lloyd cannot be avoided,
can the migrant camp situation be analyzed in such a way so as to
protect the first amendment rights of those seeking entry? This
Note responds to these questions.
I
THE LANDLORD-TENANT RATIONALE
In Franceschina v. Morgan29 and Folgueras v. Hassle30 the courts
J.). The majority opinion, in contrast, judged the relatedness of the speech in light of the
normal, quotidian uses of the land. The majority also indicated that "relatedness" would be
judged in part by the audience the protesters wished to reach; if the audience were merely the
public in general, the court noted, there could be no relatedness between message and use.Id.
at 564.
24 Id. at 566-67.
25 Camp owners might suggest, for instance, that local newspapers be utilized to convey
messages to the migrants without any trespassory infringement on camp land. See notes
152-53 infra.
26 This argument would be especially effective where those seeking access were attempt-
ing to disseminate a message about the plight of Mexican-Americans. In that instance, camp
owners could argue that even if many migrants were Chicanos the message was still directed to
a larger group and lacked the particularity of relationship to the land use required by Lloyd.
See note 23 supra.
27 The lack of a clear definition of "public function" makes this argument attractive. See
note 22 and accompanying text supra.
21 TheLloyd Court made it clear that all three factors would have to be present before the
first amendment would protect the free-speech rights of those seeking access. 407 U.S. at 563.
29 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972). The defendants in Franceschina were a packing
company, that had interests in farming operations in Indiana, and the company's president.
The company ran camps in seven Indiana counties to house migrants who worked in the
company's farming operations and worked for other farmers in the area. Id. at 834-35. The
plaintiffs were employees of organizations funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity and
union organizers working for the United Farm Workers. The pla'intiffs were forbidden to
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held that migrants were tenants within the meaning of state law.31
As tenants, the migrants were entitled to invite whatever guests they
chose into their homes free from landlord interference .3  The
courts reasoned that the labor the migrants performed for the camp
owners was in part consideration for the "lease" of camp housing. 33
The Folgueras court, in determining that the relationship between
camp owner and migrant was one of landlord and tenant, spe-
cifically noted that the migrants occupied their homes exclusively for
a fixed term3 4 and that the landlord was bound by a federal gov-
ernment regulation to provide housing satisfying a minimum stan-
dard.35 Thus, the migrants had entered into a "lease" with definite
terms.
enter the defendant's property, and plaintiff Franceschina was excluded from the camps on
the grounds that he was "long haired, liberal, [and] a socialist." Id. at 836. When the plain-
tiffs entered on the land of the company, they were arrested. They then brought an action
for injunctive relief to protect their alleged right of access to the camps. Id. at 834.
30 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971). The plaintiffs inFolgueras were student empldy-
ees of the United Migrants for Opportunity, Inc., and a family of migrant workers. The
student employees had received invitations from a migrant named Gutierrez to visit the
defendant's camp to help care for the Gutierrez's sick children. Id. at 617. When the plaintiffs
arrived at the camp, they were attacked by the defendant, who kept plaintiff Folgueras pinned
to the ground for two hours with a shotgun pointed at his head. The plaintiffs were then
arrested for trespass. Id. They brought an action for a declaratory judgment and for damages
both for the physical attack and for the denial of access.
31 346 F. Supp. at 838; 331 F. Supp. at 624. The Franceschina and Folgueras courts did not
base their decisions to grant access solely on the tenancy rationale. The Folgueras court also
held that the activities of the plaintiffs were protected by the first and fourteenth amendments
(331 F. Supp. at 623), and that the defendant did not have a possessory interest in land
protected by the state's trespass laws (331 F. Supp. at 624). The Franceschina court also found
that the first and fourteenth amendments protected the plaintiffs. 346 F. Supp. at 837-39.
3 346 F. Supp. at 839; 331 F. Supp. at 625. The Franceschina court spoke of a "constitu-
tional" right to invite guests into the home and a corresponding right of access for the visitor.
346 F. Supp. at 839. The Franceschina opinion is extraordinarily confused, and the reader has
to search hard for the rationale supporting the court's result. The court writes:
This is consideration enough... to denote the migrant a tenant for the term of the
crop season. A tenant sui generis, perhaps, but yet a tenant.
In short, the controlling status here is that the migrants are citizens of the United
States, residing in their own homes, and are entitled to be treated as such. By the
same token, their would-be visitors have the constitutional right to visit with them,
subject to the discretion of the migrants ....
Id. at 838-39. Thus, in two paragraphs the court suggests that (1) migrants have the rights of
tenants, (2) migrants have the rights of citizens, and (3) visitors have the constitutional right to
visit with the migrants if the migrants invite them. None of these propositions logically follows
each other.
3' 346 F. Supp. at 838; 331 F. Supp. at 625. For a case where migrants did pay rent, and
thus were clearly tenants, see State v. Fox, 82 Wash. 2d 289, 510 P.2d 230 (1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1130 (1974). The Fox case is unusual in that a separate rental agreement was signed
by the migrants.
14 346 F. Supp. at 838.
3r 20 C.F.R. §§ 620.1-.17 (1975). An employer of migrant workers must satisfy minimum
standards for housing if he makes use of the interstate agricultural recruitment services of the
[Vol. 61:560
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The Franceschina-Folgueras analysis seems, at first glance, to pro-
vide an attractive way to avoid any constitutional questions posed by
the access problem. Landlord-tenant law is familiar ground for both
courts and poverty lawyers. 36 The right of tenants to invite guests
onto their leased premises is well established by law,3 7 as both the
Folgueras and Franceschina courts observed.3 8 Finally, the migrant-
camp owner relationship seems to fit the classic model of a land-
lord-tenant situation. In both circumstances, an owner relinquishes
the right of possession of his premises for a fixed term to a party
who provides a consideration in return.3 9
Unfortunately, several problems are raised by the use of the
landlord-tenant model for resolving conflicts concerning access.
First, courts in a vast majority of jurisdictions have held that no
tenancy is created when rent-free housing is- furnished to an em-
ployee by an employer to enable the employee to better perform his
duties.4 ° Courts have characterized the relationship created in this
situation as one of master and servant rather than one of landlord
and tenant.41 Under the majority rule, the migrant-camp owner
relationship would not establish a recognized tenancy.a2 The Fran-
ceschina court was not confronted with any precedent to this effect,43
United States Employment Service, as did the employers in both Franceschina and Folgueras.
346 F. Supp. at 835; 331 F. Supp. at 624.
36 For a persuasive argument that poverty lawyers know too much about landlord-tenant
law, see CommentLegal Services and Landlord-Tenant Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 82 YALE L.J.
1495 (1973). The author of that piece suggests that poverty lawyers too often litigate hopeIdss
tenant claims, thus overburdening the courts while providing few benefits to their clients.
'7 See Brown v. Kisner, 192 Miss. 746, 763, 6 So. 2d 611, 617 (1942); Lott v. State, 159
Miss. 484, 490, 132 So. 336, 338 (1931); Denver v. Sharpless, 191 Pa. Super. 554, 557, 159
A.2d 7, 9 (1960).
38 346 F. Supp. at 839; 331 F. Supp. at 625.
39 In speaking of the migrant-camp owner relationship, the Folgueras court noted:
Thus, all the elements of the typical landlord-tenant relationship are present. The
migrant pays for the dwelling he occupies; the landlord binds himself to provide a
dwelling of a fixed quality; the migrant occupies the dwelling exclusive of the
landlord for an agreed upon term-the length of his employment.
331 F. Supp. at 624.
10 See, e.g., Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala. 530,30 So. 488 (1901); Wukaloff v. Malibu Lake
Mountain, 96 Cal. App. 2d 147,214 P.2d 832 (1950); Mead v. Pollock, 99 111. App. 151 (1900);
Mayer v. Norton, 62 Misc. 2d 887, 310 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970).
1 See, e.g., Guiel v. Barnes, 100 Conn. 737, 125 A. 91 (1924).
42 For instance, in both Folgueras and Franceschina the migrants received their housing as
part of their employment- agreement. In Franceschina the situation was somewhat more
complicated than in Folgueras. The camp owner in the former case had migrants living on his
property who were not in his employ. It is conceivable, therefore, that in a jurisdiction
following the majority rule a landlord-tenant relationship would arise between the camp
owner and the nonemployee residents of his camp but that no tenancy would be created
between the camp owner and his own employees.
43 The defendants in Franceschina argued that the migrants should be classed as servants
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but the Folgueras court ignored a line of Michigan cases following the
majority rule.
44
The majority rule is supported by sound public policy consider-
ations. Rent-free housing furnished by an employer to an employee
is in most cases part of the compensation furnished by the employer
under an employment contract.4 5 In delineating the legal duties of
the parties in such a situation it makes sense to focus on the primary
relationship between them.46 Moreover, characterizing their duties
in a conflict over housing as arising from a master and servant
relationship normally affords more protection to the employee than
would a landlord-tenant analysis.47 Although, as one eminent trea-
tise writer has pointed out, the rule is riddled with judicially created
exceptions,48 it has been adopted in the Restatement (Second) of'
Property.49 To gain acceptance of a landlord-tenant analysis in the
migrant camp situation, proponents of this solution would be forced
to convince courts to overrule adverse precedent supporting the
majority rule.
and not as tenants. The court said the differences in characterization "matter[ed] not' and
then proceeded to explain at length why the migrants were tenants. 346 F. Supp. at 838. In
any event, a diligent search of Indiana case law indicates that this issue had not been decided
in Indiana when Franceschina arose.
44 In School District No. 11 v. Batsche, 106 Mich. 330, 64 N.W. 196 (1895), the Michigan
Supreme Court had held that a teacher occupying a residence furnished him by his employer
was in a master-servant, and not a landlord-tenant, relationship. In Tucker v. Burt, 152 Mich.
68, 115 N.W. 722 (1908), a similar result was reached in the case of a janitor occupying
rent-free premises furnished him by his employer.
45 Some courts have noted that a tenancy might arise if the employer received rent in
exchange for the let premises; in such a case, the rental contract would be independent of the
employment contract. Womack v.Jenkins, 128 Mo. App. 408, 107 S.W. 423 (1908). One court
has suggested that if the employer allows his servant-employee to exercise the right of a tenant
to sublet the premises, a tenancy will then be implied. Snedaker v. Powell, 32 Kan. 396, 4 P.
869 (1884).
46 This is especially true in situations where legal duties may change depending on the
characterization of the relationship between the parties. In such circumstances it seems logical
to look at the primary relationship of the parties to determine legal duties, since the parties
themselves are likely to have their expectations determined by the primary relationship.
47 Tort law is one area where the master-servant characterization would work to the
employee-"tenant's" advantage. For instance, in Guiel v. Barnes, 100 Conn. 737, 125 A. 91
(1924), the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision holding that a
"landlord" had not been negligent in causing his "tenant's" death. The court held that the
"landlord" was a "master" and the "tenant" a "servant"; hence, a higher standard of duty was
owed the servant-employee than would have been the case had the deceased party been a
mere tenant. An employee-servant can also claim that his right to the premises furnished him
by his employer continues for the life of his employment contract, and can thus defeat an
attempt by his employer to evict him. Cf. School District No. 11 v. Batsche, 106 Mich. 330, 64
N.W. 196 (1895).
48 See A. CASNER, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.8 (1952), for an argument that the
rule is not applied absolutely whenever rent-free housing is furnished by an employer to his
employee, and that exceptions to the rule are numerous.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
(Vol. 61:560
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Other problems arise if migrants are characterized as tenants by
the courts. Conceivably, migrants could bargain away their right to
invite guests onto their leased premises by a specific contractual
provision. Such a lease clause could possibly be voided on public
policy grounds. 50 Courts have refused, on public policy grounds, to
enforce lease clauses that relieve the landlord of liability for personal
injury5' or that force indigent tenants to pay landlord attorney's
fees. 52 A landlord could counter such arguments by contending that
a "no-guest" lease clause is no more obnoxious than clauses prohibit-
ing wild parties or excessive noise, which are routinely enforced by
courts. 53 In any event, if the landlord-camp owner were to force the
migrant to agree to such a lease clause, the migrant tenant, rather
than an outsider, would then be the only party with standing to
challenge the validity of the clause.
54
50 The tenant could argue that the right to invite guests onto his property is an integral
part of the bargained-for leasehold. This argument is premised on the assumption that the
tenant should have an implied right to use the leased property as he sees fit so long as no waste
is committed. The landlord's right to restrict the use the tenant makes of the leased property,
the tenant argues, should be limited to lease clauses reasonably related to the landlord's
legitimate concern with preventing waste. The tenant would thus contend that this right to
invite guests is analogous to his right to be free from legal and physical obstacles erected by the
landlord that hinder the tenant's occupancy of the leased property. See Richard Paul, Inc. v.
Union Improvement Co., 33 Del. Ch. 113, 91 A.2d 49 (1952) (court forced landlord to remove
physical barriers impeding tenant's access to leased premises); Plaza Amusement Co. v.
Rothenberg, 159 Miss. 800, 834-36, 131 So. 350, 356 (1930) (court cited with approval rule
that where property is leased for particular use, landlord may not interpose legal obstacles to
such use).
51 See Crowell v. Housing Authority, 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973); McCutcheon v. United
Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443,486 P.2d 1093 (1971). Exculpatory clauses in leases have been
declared invalid by statute in some states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5515 (1974); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-105 (1974); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1964). Fora
general discussion of the validity of exculpatory clauses in leases, see C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER
& P. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 839-42
(1974).
52 See, e.g., Edot Realty Co. v. Levinson, 54 Misc. 2d 673, 283 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1967).
53 The landlord's argument would rest on the general principle that parties to a leasehold
contract can consent to almost any terms they wish in a leasehold agreement. The landlord can
argue that the right to invite guests onto leased property has never given the tenant the right
to create a nuisance or to use the premises for disreputable purposes. See Miles v. Lauraine, 99
Ga. 402, 27 S.E. 739 (1896); Sullivan v. Waterman, 20 R.I. 372, 39 A. 243 (1898). Thus, the
landlord could argue that the parties should have the right to agree in their lease as to what
constitutes a nuisance or a disreputable use. If the parties agree that the presence of union
organizers would create a nuisance, the landlord would argue, then the parties should be free
to write into the lease a prohibition on visits by such organizers. Moreover, the landlord could
argue that the right of a lessor to restrict the uses to which his premises are put is well
recognized in law. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Courson, 212 Ala. 573, 103 So. 667
(1925); Denecke v. Henry F. Miller & Son, 142 Iowa 486, 119 N.W. 380 (1909); Lamont Bldg.
Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946).
54 Thus, outsiders would not have standing to bring an action to void a lease clause since
they were not parties to the contract. The court test could only arise if the migrant brought an
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Rather than risk a court test of a no-guest clause, a camp owner
might decide not to execute a lease with his migrant-tenant, thus
leaving the migrant a tenant at will.55 The landlord could then evict
any migrant who invited undesirable guests into his home.56 Courts
have held that a landlord may not evict a tenant at will in retaliation
for complaints made to a local housing authority.57 These cases,
however, can be distinguished from an eviction in retaliation for
inviting an undesirable guest onto leased premises. First, the courts
that forbid retaliatory evictions for complaints to housing authorities
have reasoned that the smooth operation of state and municipal
housing laws would be interfered with if tenants did not feel free to
complain to state and municipal agencies about housing condi-
tions.58 But state policy in support of the right of the migrants to
unionize or to join a political movement seems lacking. Moreover,
complaints to housing authorities strike at the very heart of the
landlord-tenant relationship: the condition of the leased premises.
action for declaratory relief or if the migrant were evicted for violating a no-guest rule and
sought to defend by pleading that the dause was unconscionable. For a discussion of standing
to contest the terms of a lease, see Flesher v. St. Paul Apartment House Co., 151 Minn. 146,
186 N.W. 232 (1922) (member of tenant's family had no standing to bring an action to enforce
covenant between tenant and landlord).
55 The migrant would be a tenant at will since his tenancy .would be at the mutual
pleasure of the parties and there would be no express contract setting forth the terms of the
leasehold, thus creating an implied tenancy at will.
56 The right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy at will has until recently been thought to
be absolute. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Frye, 263 Mass. 318, 160 N.E. 829 (1928); Freedline v.
Cielensky, 115 Ohio App. 138, 184 N.E.2d 433 (1961); Lyons v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry.,
209 Pa. 550, 58 A. 924 (1904).
57 Recently, courts have carved out an exception to the general rule that a tenancy at will
is terminable at the will of the landlord. The exception has been limited to cases where the
landlord's termination of the tenancy was in retaliation for the tenant's complaint to local
housing authorities. The leading case in this area is Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). A similar result has been reached in other jurisdic-
tions. See Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970); Schweiger v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970). Some states have sought to
provide a retaliatory-eviction defense by statute. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 34-20-10 to -11 (1970).
58 For instance, the court in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1016 (1969), reasoned that the District of Columbia's housing code's
[e]ffective implementation and enforcement... depend in part on private initiative
in the reporting of violations....
The notion that the effectiveness of remedial legislation will be inhibited if those
reporting violations of it can legally be intimidated is so fundamental that a presump-
tion against the legality of such intimidation can be inferred ....
Id. at 700-02. The other cases finding that a retaliatory-eviction defense exists also have
based their holding on state housing law. See, e.g., Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 397, 173
N.W.2d 297, 301 (1970).
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Courts, in protecting tenants from retaliatory eviction for com-
plaints to housing authorities, have been at least partially motivated
by a desire to see that a tenant has at least some protection, and thus
some bargaining power, in his disputes with a landlord over housing
conditions. 9 Courts in retaliatory eviction cases have, however, been
very careful to limit the availability of the defense.60
It is unlikely that courts would be willing to restrict the tradi-
tional power of the landlord to evict a tenant at will where the
dispute prompting the eviction is unrelated to housing; otherwise,
every tenant at will might attempt to invoke "public policy" to pre-
vent his eviction. 61 Moreover, it is difficult to find the requisite state
action when a landlord uses eviction to stifle his tenant's exercise of
free speech. 62 State action is a prerequisite to a free-speech de-
" See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
60 The complaint of the migrant could conceivably be stretched to fit the Habib retaliato-
ry-eviction defense. Thus, if a migrant invited visitors into his house to complain about the
conditions of his housing, he could claim a retaliatory purpose existed if the landlord then
sought to evict him. However, the Habib court and other courts that have considered the issue
have left open the question of whether complaints about housing made to someone other than
a state-authorized housing agency would allow the tenant to plead a retaliatory-eviction
defense. Logic suggests, however, that if the retaliatory-eviction defense is based on state
statutes establishing housing agencies to handle tenant complaints, then the defense should be
limited to cases where tenants complain to the statutorily created housing authorities.
61 Some public policy argument could be found to protect the tenant in almost any
eviction of a tenant at will. A tenant evicted because the landlord found a party willing to pay
more rent could claim that public policy favors providing housing for the poor; therefore, as
the poorer of the possible tenants he should be allowed to stay in his apartment. Such an
argument is specious, but does indicate the wisdom of limiting Habib and the other retaliatory
eviction cases to situations where the retaliatory purpose is dear and the eviction is in
retaliation for complaints made to the proper authorities.
62 In Habib, Judge Wright considered whether the ordering of an eviction by a court
constituted sufficient state action so as to prevent the court from ordering the eviction on first
amendment grounds. 397 F.2d at 690-98. Judge Wright concluded that some support for the
proposition that state action was involved in the mere enforcement by the courts of an eviction
could be found in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Judge Wright, however, refused to
decide the first amendment issue because narrower statutory grounds existed for granting the
tenant the relief sought. 397 F.2d at 699.
The district court in Hose.y v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
squarely held that the enforcement by a court of an eviction constituted sufficient state action
so as to give the tenant involved the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. The
court noted that "[t]here is no doubt today that judicial action in private disputes is a form of
state action .... " Id. at 505. If the Hosey court is correct, migrants would certainly be
protected by the first amendment from eviction in retaliation for their exercise of first
amendment rights. The Hosey court, however, seems clearly wrong. The actions of courts in
enforcing eviction laws that do not themselves. infringe on first or fourteenth amendment
rights would seem to involve no impermissible state infringement of freedom of speech or of
equal protection. The court in such a case is merely neutrally enforcing laws that are them-
selves constitutionally valid. Cf Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In Lindsey the Court
pointed out that "[t]he Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of landlord-tenant
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:560
fense.63 Judicial enforcement of the eviction would not seem to be a
sufficient basis for finding state action. 64 Thus, camp owners could
freely evict their migrant-tenants at will.
Even if migrant-tenants could plead a free-speech defense to
thwart attempted evictions, difficulties would still remain for outsid-
ers seeking to visit the migrants. Organizing migrants involves con-
tacting workers quickly 65 and often. 66 Under a tenancy model, this
type of contact would be difficult. Mass meetings on camp property
that is not used for residential purposes could be forbidden by camp
owners.67 Organizers would be required to receive invitations from
individual migrants before they could enter camp property.6 8 Mi-
grants who extended such invitations would be subject to retaliatory
action by the camp owner.69 The tenancy rationale seems to provide
relations .... Id. at 68. The Court implied that the Constitution did not require that the
states make a retaliatory-eviction defense available. The Court expressly noted, in discussing
the permissible variety of state landlord-tenant law, that many states did not provide for a
retaliatory-eviction defense, and implied that this was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 69.
Moreover, good sense argues that not every issue that reaches a court immediately cloaks
the parties with a robe of constitutional protection since state action is then involved simply
because a court is acting as a mediator between the parties. As the Supreme Court pointed out
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), state involvement must be "significant"
before the Constitution will dictate the parameters of the relationships engaged in by private
parties. Id. at 173, quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). It is hard to find
significant state action in a routine processing of evictions. The eviction cases can be easily
distinguished from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the Court, by l5ositively
enforcing a restrictive covenant, thwarted the will of the parties who wished to buy and sell
land in violation of the discriminatory covenant. The court, by enforcing the covenant,
positively fostered racial discrimination. A court in an eviction case, however, merely acts as a
neutral referee between the parties. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,445 (1970) (distinguish-
ing Shelley from court enforcement of cy pres doctrine).
63 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 173 (1972).
64 See note 62 supra.
6' See J. DUNNE, DELANO: THE STORY OF THE CALIFORNIA GRAPE STRIKE 55 (1967), for
Saul Alinsky's description of the tactics that would produce the best result in a farm workers'
organizing campaign.
66 For a description of the repeated marches, speeches, and picketing necessary for the
successful conduct of an organizing campaign among the migrants, see E. NELSON, HUELGA
(1966).
67 As tenants, migrants could control only their abodes; their right to invite guests would
extend only to their own homes and not to land beyond their control. On land not used for
housing, the landlord could still exercise full rights of ownership, including the right to evict
trespassers.
68 Thus, as "guests," outside organizers would be forced to receive invitations before they
could enter migrant homes. Since migrant workers are not covered by the National Labor
Relations Act, organizers would not have the right to receive lists of migrants from employers
in order to contact the workers to solicit such an invitation. For a discussion of how this
problem is handled under the National Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
69 Thus, camp owners could increase the work the disfavored migrant was forced to
perform, shift the migrant to less desirable premises, or fire a migrant who had the courage to
invite an "undesirable" into his house.
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little protection to the migrant and no effective aid to the organizer
or social worker seeking access to the migrant camps.
II
THE State v. Shack RATIONALE
In State v. Shack, 7 0 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
state's trespass law protected only the legitimate possessory interests
of a landlord.7 1 Since a landowner may not use his ownership rights
in land to harm others,7 2 the court reasoned that he could not utilize
the trespass laws to protect such prohibited uses. 73 To further but-
tress its analysis and result, the court invoked the recognized tort
doctrine that necessity may justify trespass.7 4 The court argued that
the condition of the migrants made it necessary for outsiders to
enter private land to aid them.
75
Shack has been favorably noted76 and often cited.77 The Shack
analysis provides a way around many of the difficulties posed by the
tenancy rationale. Shack removes the trespass weapon from the
landlord's legal arsenal and seems to provide unlimited access to the
migrant camps.7 8 However, this approach raises problems of its
own. For instance, the court provided no guidelines delineating the
70 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). Shack involved the arrest for trespass of an organizer
for the Southwest Citizens Organization for Poverty Elimination and an attorney affiliated
with Camden Regional Legal Services. No one appeared to argue the state's case before the
New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. at 299, 277 A.2d at 370.
71 Id. at 302-03, 277 A.2d at 371-72.
72 Id. at 303-05, 277 A.2d at 372-73.
73 Id. at 302-03, 277 A.2d at 371.
74 The court, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 197-211 (1965), noted:
"Hence it has long been true that necessity, private or public, mayjustify entry upon the land
of another." 58 N.J. at 305, 277 A.2d at 373.
75 Id.
78 Comment, Criminal Trespass, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 834 (1971); 25 Sw. L.J. 789 (1971). The
author of the N.Y.U. Law Review Comment finds that Shack introduces a desirable flexibility
into trespass law. I find the Shack opinion to lead to undesirable uncertainty.
7 See, e.g., Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130 (3d
Cir. 1975), for an instance where Shack was cited quite inappropriately.
78 The Shack court indicated that the camp owner might bar salesmen, and could ask
visitors to identify themselves. However, his right to control access extended no further. The
court concluded:
But the employer may not deny the worker his privacy or interfere with his oppor-
tunity to live with dignity and to enjoy associations customary among our citizens.
These rights are too fundamental to be denied on the basis of an interest in real
property ....
58 N.J. at 308, 277 A.2d at 374. The Shack court did not consider whether the wages paid
migrants interfered with their opportunity to live in dignity. The Shack opinion, like many
migrant-worker cases, is stronger on good intentions than on substance.
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point at which the landlord's possessory interest might be protected
by the trespass laws.7 9 The use of the tort law necessity doctrine to
support the result further complicates this issue. Under traditional
tort law, necessity is a defense to trespass only in very narrow
circumstances. 80 The defense is only available when the alleged
trespass occurred to avoid the immediate threat of physical harm or
damage to property,8' or when the trespasser entered land to rescue
someone in physical danger. 82 The common law zealously guarded
the rights of landowners, and exceptions to the rule of "no trespass"
were narrowly drawn. 83 Under Shack, however, any time the fun-
damental rights84 of the migrants are endangered, trespass will be
justified. The responsibility of determining when such "fundamen-
tal rights" are jeopardized is placed on the trial judge.
Judges who are not inclined to expand the traditional necessity
defense are free to limit Shack to situations where the lives or health
'9 The failure of the Shack court to delineate precise standards for the application of its
ruling was perceived by the writer of the Comment in theN.Y.U. Law Review (see note 76supra)
as a virtue of the opinion. His praise of Shack exposes the weakness of the opinion:
To guarantee access to the workers, it is necessary only that the court, at a given point
in time, make a sociological determination of what human values need protection and
balance these interests against what it perceives are the landowner's property rights.
Comment, supra note 76, at 848 (emphasis added). There is no question that judges are
constantly making judgments about which values in society are fundamental. It is also indis-
putable that courts frequently weigh competing interests in arriving at a rule of decision. See
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). I quarrel with the author of the
N.Y.U. Law Review Comment, however, as to whether trespass law lends itself to such a
balancing process. As this Note attempts to make dear, I argue that it is preferable to leave
trespass as a strict liability tort in order to adequately protect the interests of landowners; this
strict liability would not, however, reach those individuals protected by the first amendment
who sought entry onto the land. The problem with Shack is that it diminishes the protection
afforded landowners when there is a trespass and first amendment rights are not involved, but
the trespasser is able to invoke some other "fundamental right" to justify his actions.
80 As Dean Prosser noted, the situations where necessity has been recognized as a defense
are "comparatively small [in] number." The most obvious example, of course, occurs when the
defendant trespasses on land to save his own life. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ToRTs § 24 (4th ed. 1971) and cases cited therein.
81 See, e.g., Rossi v. DelDuca, 344 Mass. 66, 181 N.E.2d 591 (1962); Depue v. Flateau, 100
Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907); Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). Some courts
have held that even when the trespass was committed to save valuable property or the
trespasser's life, the trespasser is liable to the landowner for any damage done the landowner's
property, although the trespasser is not liable unless actual damage to the property of
the landowner has occurred. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 100 Minn. 456, 124
N.W. 221 (1910). This principle has been accepted in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 263 (1965).
82 See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956); People v. Gallmon, 19
N.Y.2d 389, 227 N.E.2d 284, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (1968).
83 See note 80 supra.
84 58 N.J. at 308, 277 A.2d at 374.
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of the migrants is threatened. This result is consistent with tradi-
tional tort law. 85 However, if courts read Shack broadly, the problem
of determining what are "fundamental rights" becomes important.
Could a court determine that a living wage was a fundamental right,
and order access to preserve that right? Such a result is possible
under Shack. If a union organizer was allowed entry, could he be
arrested for trespass if after entry he carried on activity unrelated to
this fundamental right?86 Moreover, the holding of Shack is not
limited to migrant-camp owner situations, but is broad enough to be
applied to all trespass disputes. 87 Other trespassers could cite Shack
to justify their actions. Thus, Shack substitutes a flexible standard of
liability for traditional strict liability for trespass. It is questionable
whether such a radical change in the law should have been un-
dertaken by the courts absent Jegislative guidance. In any event,
Shack significantly diminishes landowner protection against trespass.
This result, in turn, raises constitutional questions.
The Lloyd decision can be interpreted as holding that the right
of a property owner to be free from trespass is constitutionally
protected.88 If Lloyd is so read, it is open to question whether a state
could constitutionally grant the public a greater "right to trespass"
than is allowable under Lloyd. The freedom of a state to alter its
trespass laws may thus be constitutionally circumscribed. Therefore,
Shack would not avoid Lloyd's stricture; it would simply force courts
to deal with the Lloyd standards while using the "fundamental-
rights" vocabulary of Shack.
85 See cases cited in notes 81-82 supra. Thus, doctors could probably enter upon a camp
owner's land to provide medical services to ailing migrants under the necessity doctrine.
Conceivably, social workers delivering food stamps might be able to argue that they were
trespassing to "rescue" the migrants from starvation.
88 To pose a hypothetical but not farfetched case: A union organizer enters the land of a
camp owner to talk to the workers about unionization. This speech is found by the courts to be
necessary to preserve a fundamental right of the migrants. While on camp property, the union
organizer promotes the candidacy of a liberal political candidate or he urges the migrants to
buy food at a cooperative store run by the union. Could the camp owner then claim that the
organizer's activity was no longer related to a "fundamental right" of the migrants and thus
call in the constabulary? Shack leaves such questions unanswered.
" The language of Shack is broad. The court states "[a) man's right in his real property of
course is not absolute." 58 N.J. at 305, 277 A.2d at 373. Throughout its opinion, the court
speaks of the limitations placed on landowners in general. Id. at 305-06, 277 A.2d at
373-74.
88 The Lloyd Court spoke of the "Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private
property owners" as being constitutionally protected when those rights were invaded by
trespassers. 407 U.S. at 570. The Court expressly pointed out that it had "never held that a
trespasser ... may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and
used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only." Id. at 568.
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III
Marsh Redivivus
A possible means to avoid a Lloyd balancing test in the access
cases, while still granting first amendment protection to outsiders
and migrants, has been advanced by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp. 8 9 and
the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co. 90
Both courts found that migrant camps were "company towns" 91 and
held that in such situations Marsh v. Alabama92 dictated that full first
amendment rights would be guaranteed to those entering such a
"town. 93 Marsh, the courts held, was the only precedent applicable
to the company-town situations. 94 Under Marsh, the courts argued, a
company-town owner had only the rights of a municipality to reg-
ulate free speech.
9 5
Under the rationale of Petersen and Campbell Soup a migrant
89 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973). Because fact situations are so important in a determination
that a particular camp is a "company town," it is important to consider the facilities provided
by the camp owner in Petersen. The Petersen camp contained a kitchen, mess hall, recreation
facilities, and a store. A chaplain conducted regular services at the camp. A store sold general
merchandise. The camp covered 38,000 acres and was 25 miles from the nearest town. Id.
at 75-76. In People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga Co. Ct. 1971), the
court found the camp in question to be a company town. The Rewald camp had a food service
open to members of the public, a church, a grocery store, a baseball field and a basketball
court, public showers, a barber shop, a telephone, lighted streets, a sewage system, and a
day-care and health center. Id. at 454-55, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.
90 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975). This case was an appeal from a dismissal of the Illinois
Migrant Council's action for a dedaratory judgment and for damages. The district court
found that, on the basis of the pleadings, the camp in question was not a "company town." The
pleadings contained only sketchy allegations about the municipal services provided by the
camp. In reversing the district court, Judge Tuttle pointed out that the pleadings should
have been read in a light most favorable to the plaintiff Migrant Council. So read, Judge
Tuttle argued,
[it lwould... seem reasonable to infer that a community of 150 persons, located some
miles from any other town, must have some means of protecting itself from crime and
fire, and must have some means of disposing of its sewage.
Id. at 395. Thus, the court argued, the camp in question could be found to be a company town
within the meaning of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The case was remanded to the
district court for a further finding of facts. 519 F.2d at 397.
91 478 F.2d at 82; 519 F.2d at 395.
92 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
93 478 F.2d at 82; 519 F.2d at 396.
91 The court in Campbell Soup succinctly stated its view of this issue:
If Prince Crossing has the characteristics of a municipality and serves as a functional
equivalent of a normal town to its inhabitants, it is not necessary to attempt to define
the use to which the public is invited to put the town to [sic], or to evaluate alternative
means of communication.
519 F.2d at 396-97.
11 478 F.2d at 82; 519 F.2d at 396.
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camp owner could in all likelihood reasonably regulate the time and
place where meetings are held.96 Reasonable regulation of camp
streets would be tolerated. 97 Certain parts of the camp not normally
dedicated to a "public" use might be declared off-limits to speak-
ers. 98 The camp owner could not, however, require speakers to
obtain an invitation from the migrants before speaking.99 Large
public gatherings could not be absolutely forbidden.100 Although
the camp owner might be able to regulate the places where notices of
union meetings or other activities were posted, 1 1 he could not
prohibit the posting of such notices in toto (as he could if migrants
were merely tenants rather than residents of the company town).
The company-town rationale would significantly limit the control of
the camp owner over his property. However, the Petersen and
Campbell Soup cases present their own difficulties.
First, the criteria for determining when an employer's property
becomes a company town have never been clearly defined. In
Marsh,10 2 the Court noted that the company property was a town
because of the level of "municipal" services it provided. 10 3 The Court
also emphasized that outsiders coming into the town would have
96 See, e.g., Abernathy v. Conroy, 429 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1970) (upholding a limitation
on hours during which parades were permitted).
9 See, e.g., Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968); Hamer v. Musselwhite, 376
F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1967); Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La.
1962).
9I This follows from Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The Court in Adderly held
that the first amendment did not protect protesters who sought to demonstrate on govern-
ment-owned property if that property was not normally dedicated to a public use. It follows
that if a company town's owner can exercise all the powers of a municipality in regulating free
speech, he could declare property not normally open to the migrants off-limits to outsiders.
19 It has long been held that the first amendment protects the right to speak even if the
audience does not wish to hear the speaker. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (state
legislator's statement opposing American involvement in Viet Nam protected by the first
amendment even though statement found offensive to fellow legislators in legislative context);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (duty of police to protect picketers who were exercising
first amendment rights despite hostility of crowd gathered to watch picketing).
100 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
101 See Chicago Park Dist. v. Lyons, 39 Ill. 2d 584, 237 N.E.2d 519, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
939 (1968). The Lyons court held that the state could forbid the posting of religious tracts on
car windshields if the disseminator of the tracts had other means for getting the tracts to
the public. The court found that the state had a legitimate interest in regulating littering so
long as the pursuit of that interest did not have the effect of totally stifling speech.
102 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
103 In stating the facts of the case for the Court, Justice Black noted:
The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage
disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places are situated. A deputy
of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman.
Merchant and service establishments have rented the stores ... and the United States
uses one of the places as a post office ....
Id. at 502-03.
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little notice that the land in question was privately owned since the
company made no effort to restrict access to the property.' 0 4 The
exact weight, if any, to be given these factors was left unclear in
Marsh, '0 5 and no other courts have significantly developed the anal-
ysis. 10 6 However, even under the sketchy criteria of Marsh it seems
that a company could, by decreasing the level of services provided to
its employees and by restricting access to the company-owned prop-
erty, effectively convert a company town into mere private property.
Marsh makes the first amendment protections afforded nonem-
104 The Court nated:
The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can not be distinguished from
the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled,
and according to all indications the residents use the business block as their regular
shopping center.
Id. at 503.
105 The exact weight to be given these factors was left unclear by the Marsh Court,
probably because the Court did not think of the case as one involving the narrow question of
what constitutes a company town. Justice Black, writing for the majority, spoke of the Marsh
rule as if it were applicable to all situations where property rights and first amendment rights
conflict. He wrote:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of
the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.
Id. at 509. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter also wrote as if Marsh were
intended to be of general applicability. Id. at 510.
Courts read Marsh as addressing the general problem of resolving the conflict between
property rights and first amendment rights rather than as a narrow "company town" case. See,
e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (finding Marsh in point in determining whether a shopping center could forbid
picketing on its premises); Wolin v. Port Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968) (Marsh relevant to determining whether a bus terminal could forbid handbilling);
In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (Marsh relevant to
railroad station context); People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Magis. Ct. 1948)
(Marsh applicable to railroad station dispute).
It took the ingenuity of the Lloyd Court to limitMarsh to its facts. Thus, the only guideline
as to what now constitutes a "company town" lies in the Lloyd Court's reading of Marsh. In
discussing Marsh in Lloyd, Justice Powell referred to the company town as an "economic
anomaly." 407 U.S. at 561. He then analyzed the factors that made the company town
situation different from the ordinary conflict between property rights and first amendment
rights:
[Company] towns were built.., by private capital with all of the customary services
and utilities normally afforded by a municipal or state government: there were
streets, sidewalks, sewers, public lighting, police and fire protection, business and
residential areas, churches, postal facilities, and sometimes schools .... The [Marsh]
Court simply held that where private interests were substituting for ... government,
First Amendment freedoms could not be denied .... Indeed.... [in Marsh] there
were no publicly owned streets, sidewalks, or parks where such rights could be
exercised.
Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added). Justice Powell's limitation of Marsh can be fairly read to
provide two criteria for deciding when privately owned land becomes a company town: (1) the
town must supply all the customary services of a municipality and (2) the town must be so
isolated that the speakers seeking first amendment protection have no alternative other than
entering the town to reach the residents. So read, the scope of Marsh is now very narrow.
"' See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
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ployee outsiders depend on the benevolence of the employer in
furnishing ser,'ices to his employees.10 7 Thus, if the camp owner
could show that he did not provide certain municipal services, or
that he restricted access so as to ban all outsiders, it appears that
under Marsh and Petersen-Campbell Soup the outsiders would have no
first amendment protection.10 8 By relying on a Marsh analysis to
protect the rights of those seeking to aid the migrants, the Petersen
and Campbell Soup courts furnish an incentive to other camp owners
to decrease the services provided the workers.' 0 9 In light of the
usual extreme hostility of camp owners to the social workers and
union organizers who seek entry to the camps, such a decrease is not
far-fetched.
In addition, the precedential value of Marsh was called into
question in both Lloyd and Central Hardware v. NLRB," 0 in which
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, referred to the company town
as an anachronism. In Lloyd, the Court undertook an extended
analysis of the balancing process to be applied when property rights
and speech rights conflict. This slighting of Marsh as precedent, and
the attempt of the Lloyd Court to reconcile all the cases in the area
of the conflict between speech rights and property rights indicates
that the Court may have intended Lloyd to preempt the field."' If




Lloyd AND THE MIGRANT CAMPS
In Asociacion de Trabajadores v. Green Giant Co., "1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the mi-
107 Thus, under the Lloyd Court's reading of Marsh (see note 105 supra), it would seem
that, at a minimum, the camp owner would have to furnish a substantial number of the
services provided by a municipality to be subject to the Marsh rule. A camp owner worried
about suits by potential troublemakers could cut back on the services he provides the migrants
in order to avoid granting access to his camp. The migrants might be deprived not only of the
counsel of social workers and union organizers, but also of police and fire protection and
recreation facilities. On the facts of Petersen and Campbell Soup a court could find that a
company town situation existed even under the restrictive scope given Marsh by the Llo)d
court. The company town rationale fails to protect the migrants, however, as soon as one
imagines a camp that does not furnish a large number of services to the migrants. These
serviceless camps seem to be common. See notes 1-9 and accompanying text supra; notes
122-25 infra.
'08 See note 105 supra.
109 See note 107 supra.
110 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
"I Id. at 545.
112 See note 105 supra.
113 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975). Green Giant was an action by the union for declaratory
relief. The union sought an order granting access, which was refused by the district court. The
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grant-camp access problem was within the scope of the Lloyd balanc-
ing test. The court noted that the camp was not a company town,'"
4
that property rights and free-speech rights were in conflict, and
hence Lloyd was in point. 1 5 The court held that the labor camp in
question served a quasi-public function"16 and that the speech of the
petitioners was directly related to the public use to which the land
had been put." 7 Thus, two of the three Lloyd prerequisites to a
finding that first amendment rights would take precedence over
property rights were satisfied by the union petitioner. The court
held, however, that the union had not met its burden of proof in
showing that no adequate alternative means of communicating its
message existed." 8 Such a showing was "indispensable" to the plain-
tiff's case. 1"9 The court affirmed the verdict of the district court
denying access to the petitioners. 2 0 The Green Giant court thus
pinpointed the key issue in any discussion of Lloyd in the migrant-
camp context-the adequacy of alternative means of communica-
tion.
Lloyd set forth three tests which must be satisfied before first
amendment rights will outweigh property rights when the two
conflict. The first prerequisite is that the private land take on, to
some significant degree, the attributes of public land devoted to
public use.121 The migrant camp seems to meet this test easily.
Although camp owners may not provide enough municipal services
to qualify as company towns under Marsh, the typical camp will serve
some public functions for its residents. At a minimum, sewage dis-
posal and streets are typically provided. 122 The camp usually has a
court of appeals affirmed the judgment. Green Giant's camp covered 3,500 acres near
Middletown, Delaware. The camp had a first aid station, and fire and police protection were
furnished by state and local authorities. Green Giant made no attempt to restrict its workers'
travels to and from the camps.
114 The court read Marsh in light of Lloyd to mean that the camp must be "indistinguish-
able from a town" before Marsh could apply. Id. at 137.
1'5 The court noted:
Where the private enterprise has some, but fewer than all, of the attributes normally
associated with a community, a composite set of facts, tested under the formula of
Lloyd, might warrant... a circumscribed access to the property ....
Id.
116 Id. at 138.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 141.
119 Id. at 138.
120 Id. at 141.
121 See note 22 supra.
122 These sewage facilities may be minimal and of poor quality, but they are often at least
an attempt to provide a "municipal" waste disposal system, which is a "public function."
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company store at which the migrants shop. 123 The owner in recruit-
ing his labor force extends an invitation to one group of the
public-the potential labor force-to make use of his property.
2 4
Although the general public may be excluded from the camp once
the labor force has been recruited, 25 thus raising issues under
Marsh about the extent of restriction of access, the invitation to the
public to enter for a time, taken together with the services per-
formed for the residents, appears to vest the camp with enough
"public functions" to meet the Lloyd test.
Lloyd also demands that the speech of those asserting first
amendment rights be reasonably related to the public uses to which
the land is put.' 26 This prerequisite would also seem to be easily met
in most migrant-camp access controversies. The Lloyd court spe-
cifically mentioned the union-organizing situation as one in which
the relation between message and use would be clear.' 27 The "mes-
sage" of a social worker about food stamps or health services obvi-
ously is related to the company store or health-care facilities pro-
vided in most camps.' 28 Whereas some messages might be so unre-
122 The camps in Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973),
Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971), Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F.
Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972), and State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971), all had
company stores. On the other hand, at least one of the five camps described by Friedland and
Nelkin lacked even a small commissary. FRIEDLAND & NELKIN 37-38. Absent statistical evi-
dence, one could venture the judgment that at least camps of average quality have such a
store. The existence of such a store is not, however, crucial to a finding of a "public function"
under Lloyd in light of the other "public" functions performed by the camps. Friedland and
Nelkin do indicate that many of the camps they studied in Florida have company stores.
Id. at 5.
124 Crews ar6 generally recruited through the use of crew leaders or contractors, who
contract with farmers to furnish a crew of specified size. The Farm Labor Service of the
United States Employment Service also does some recruiting for the farmers who contract
with the agency. Since the United States Employment Service forces farmers who contract
with it to meet certain minimum health and safety standards in their camps, most farmers
prefer to do business with the independent contractors. FRIEDLAND & NELKIN 19.
"I See, e.g., Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250, 1252-53 (D. Conn. 1974), for a
description of security procedures at a typical camp. In the Velez tobacco camp, visitors were
barred at certain times of the day, had to leave before 9:00 P. M., and were forced to go
through a screening process before they were allowed to enter.
126 See note 23 supra.
127 407 U.S. at 562-63 (distinguishing Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), on its facts). The continuing vitality of Logan Valley was called into
question in a four-man plurality opinion of the Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 44 U.S.L.W.
4281, 4285 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1976). Whether the "relatedness" test of Lloyd survived Hudgens
is an open question. Four Justices in Hudgens were content to eliminate any "relatedness"
inquiry when free-speech rights and property rights conflict.
128 Thus, the social worker could argue that the "reasonable relation" test requires only a
nexus between speech and use that is easily satisfied if the speech in question directly relates to
some identifiable public use to which the land is put. Since the land is used for housing and for
cooking, messages about food stamps and welfare are related to the camp's "public" function.
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lated as to fail the Lloyd relatedness test,129 most outsiders could
easily establish the nexus between the message and the land use as
demanded by Lloyd.
The crucial issue arises under the third Lloyd standard. Lloyd
demands that those seeking access show that entry upon privately
owned land was their only adequate means of communicating their
message.' 30 This test was borrowed from an independent line of
cases concerning the right under the National Labor Relations Act
of nonemployee union organizers to enter company property dur-
ing an organizing campaign. The leading case in this series of
decisions is NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.' 3 1 The NLRB and the
courts in applying Babcock-Wilcox have developed a broad definition
of what constitutes an "adequate" alternative avenue of communica-
tion sufficient to deny outside organizers access to company prop-
erty. 32 For instance, the expense to the union in using ,alternative
means of communication has been held to be irrelevant to the issue
of whether organizers should have access if alternative means of
communication exist.'
33
Did the Lloyd Court, by adopting, almost directly, language
from the Babcock-Wilcox line of cases, intend that the standards
developed in those cases be applied in all instances where free-
speech rights and property rights conflict? The Lloyd Court left the
meaning of the "adequate-alternative" test unclear. Courts in apply-
129 For instance, the message of a politician, like the message of the Viet Nam protester in
Lloyd, would not be specifically related to the unique public uses to which the migrant camp
was put. Rather, the message would be directed to an amorphous audience composed of the
general public rather than a specific audience of migrant workers at a particular camp. The
message would in no way be related to the particular conditions of the specific camp.
130 See note 24 supra.
131 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
132 See, e.g., S.E. Nichols of Ohio, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 1130, 1973 CCH LABOR LAW REP.
24,921 (1973); Dexter Thread Mills, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 543, 1972 CCH LABOR LAW REP.
24,662 (1972); Monogram Models, 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 1971 CCH LABOR LAW REP. 23,271
(1971), for examples of situations in which the NLRB has denied access to outside union
organizers under Babcock-Wilcox.
133 For an example of the length to which courts will go to find tht adequate alternatives
exist underBabcock-Wilcox, see NLRB v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 472 F.2d 753
(8th Cir. 1973). In that case, the Inland Boatman's Union sought access to the defendant's
barges for its organizers during an organizing campaign. The NLRB granted access. The
court found that the union had made repeated attempts to call the company's employees at
home. This was difficult because the employees lived in 15 states. Mailings were unsuccessful.
In the course of the organizing drive, only 35 of 118 employees had been actually contacted by
the union. Id. at 754-55. The expense of contacting the 35 employees was considerable.
Nevertheless, the court refused to enforce the Board's order granting access, holding that, in
view of the infringement on the employer's property rights that would result from enforce-
ment, the union had. not made the "strong showing" of a lack of alternative means of
communication necessary to an order granting access. Id. at 756.
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ing the Lloyd tests have ignored Babcock-Wilcox in their analyses and
have read the "adequate-alternative" test narrowly. The Babcock-
Wilcox cases, however, do furnish an appropriate standard for inter-
preting the Lloyd "adequate-alternative" test.'34 A complete analysis
must therefore consider whether the "adequate-alternative" lan-
guage was meant to be read broadly, as in the Babcock-Wilcox cases.
The Court in Lloyd deemphasized "the effectiveness of alterna-
tive media. The same disregard of the effectiveness of an alternative
avenue of communication is present in the Babcock-Wilcox analysis.
As the dissenters in Lloyd noted, the protesters asserting their right
to enter a shopping center to handbill lacked
easy access to television, radio, the major newspapers, and the
other forms of mass media .... The only hope that these people
have to be able to communicate effectively is to be permitted to
speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens can be
found."3 5
134 Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4281
(Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1976), and Handen v. People, 526 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1974), with NLRB v.
Sioux Barge Lines, 472 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1973). Hudgens involved picketing by striking
warehouse employees at a store owned by their employer situated in a shopping center. In
considering the question of alternative access, the court indicated that the targeted audience
of the protesters would be taken into account in determining whether alternative means of
access existed. The audience the protesters sought to reach were customers of the employer.
The court found it to be too expensive to reach these customers by radio or television. 501
F.2d at 168-69. The court distinguished Babcock-Wilcox by noting that in an organizational
campaign the targeted audience was clearly identifiable by name, while in the case at bar the
audience was a less readily identifiable group, although more readily identifiable than the
public in general. Id. at 168. Thus, the court argued, different standards of weighing the
adequacy of alternative avenues of communication were warranted depending upon the
nature of the audience sought to be reached. The Handen court went even further and argued
that the method of communication chosen by the protesters should be taken into account in
determining whether adequate alternative channels of communication exist. Thus, if protest-
ers wish to distribute handbills, the alternatives available to the protesters should be judged in
light of their adequacy to do so. 526 P.2d at 1314. The Hudgens approach makes some sense
and does not depart radically from Babcock-Wilcox or Lloyd. Courts have in the past under
Babcock-Wilcox considered the nature of the targeted audience as being of some relevance in
determining whether access should be granted. See NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d
26, 29 (2d Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court, however, refused to follow the analysis of the
Hudgens court, albeit on grounds unrelated to the question of what constituted an adequate
alternative avenue of communication. Instead, the Court held, in a plurality opinion, that a
shopping center was not the functional equivalent of a municipality. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4285. The
Court thus held only that thefirst Lloyd test was not.met in the Hudgens case, and remanded the
case to the NLRB for a determination in light of Babcock & Wifcox. Id. at 4286. Babcock &
Wilcox, of course, continues to control cases under the jurisdiction of the NLRB regardless of
whether a functional equivalent of a municipality is involved in the case. The Handen ap-
proach, in contrast, overlooks entirely the clear statement in Lloyd that alternative avenues of
communication must be examined by courts in determining whether to allow access. 407 U.S.
at 567. Presumably, alternative avenues means that courts should look not only at alternative
sites for speech, but also at alternative media for communicating the message.
135 407 U.S. at 580-81 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.) (emphasis added).
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The majority ignored these arguments and instead simply noted
that some alternatives did exist for the protesters.3 6 This per-
functory evaluation of the actual availability of a supposedly effec-
tive alternative media resembles the analysis in Babcock-Wilcox NLRA
cases.
Even if Babcock-Wilcox was not the precise model that the Lloyd
Court relied on in announcing the "adequate-alternative" test, the
Babcock-Wilcox model is nevertheless an attractive one to use in
non-NLRA free-speech and property rights cases. The advantages
of the Babcock-Wilcox approach can be briefly stated.
The Babcock-Wilcox approach provides maximum protection for
property rights with a minimum infringement of the right of free
speech. For instance, if no alternative means of communication is
available, under Babcock-Wilcox free speech then takes precedence
over property rights. Under Babcock-Wilcox, as the necessity for
exercising free-speech rights in one location decreases, the corre-
sponding protection given to property rights increases. The sole
question becomes one of determining at what point free-speech
rights must yield to property rights. The Babcock-Wilcox line of cases
would draw the line as soon as some adequate alternative means
exists for communicating the speech without trespass, regardless of
the effectiveness of the alternative means. This may deny the right
to speak effectively to those seeking to convey their message on
private property. On the other hand, to allow access to private
property whenever no effective alternative means of communication
exists would severely limit the protection given property rights in any
balancing test. Presumably, those seeking entry to speak on private
property are doing so precisely because they believe that they have
no effective or inexpensive alternative way to communicate with the
"I In considering the adequacy of the alternative avenues available to the respondents in
Lloyd, the Court noted that the respondents could have moved from the shopping center to
the streets and sidewalks outside the center to deliver their handbills. The respondents had in
fact taken this course after being ordered to leave the center. Id. at 566-67. The dissent,
however, pointed out that this was a superficial reading of the facts of the case and flew in the
face of the finding of the district court that the shopping center itself was the only place where
handbills could be effectively distributed. The alternative avenue proposed by the majority,
the dissent noted, would require
respondents to run from the sidewalk, to knock on car wincfows, to ask that the
windows be rolled down so that a handbill could be distributed, to offer the handbill,
run back to the sidewalk, and to repeat this gesture for every automobile leaving
Lloyd Center ....
Id. at 583 n.7 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.). The Court's cavalier treatment of the
practical difficulties for respondents in using "available" alternative avenues of communica-
tion is similar to the disregard of the expense to the union in pursuing alternative avenues of
communication found in the labor cases. See note 133 supra.
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public they seek to reach. In such circumstances, standards of effec-
tiveness would be difficult for courts to develop. Would handbilling
on a street be an effective way to reach customers of a gasoline
station when the message sought to be conveyed was "Don't buy
gasoline"?13 7 Would television be an equally effective way to reach
shoppers at one particular store in a shopping center as leafletting
directly in front of the store? As these examples illustrate, courts
would have an almost impossible task were they forced to evaluate
the effectiveness of alternative means of communication every time
there was a speech-property rights conflict.
Babcock-Wilcox, on the other hand, does not sacrifice free-speech
rights to property rights; rather, the Babcock-Wilcox test recognizes
that trespass is an absolute infringement on the property rights of
the landowner, whereas requiring speakers to communicate in an
alternative forum does not absolutely infringe speech rights. Under
Babcock-Wilcox, speech rights are preferred over property rights, but
only in those situations where the two cannot co-exist. Thus, the
Babcock-Wilcox standards allow an absolute infringement of property
rights only in situations where there would be a corresponding
absolute infringement of speech- rights. If property rights are wor-
thy of protection, it seems theBabcock-Wilcox standards protect those
rights better than an "effectiveness" test, while not significantly
infringing the exercise of first amendment rights.
What would be the consequences of applying the Babcock-Wilcox
formulation of "adequate alternatives" to the migrant-camp prob-
lem? Although courts have found "alternative avenues" of com-
munication to exist in most Babcock-Wilcox cases, at least one case
suggests that the position of the friends of the migrants would not be
hopeless. In NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 138 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted access to a nonem-
ployee union organizer in a situation closely analogous to the
migrant-camp context. In Grossinger's, the company's employees
lived on the employer's premises.13 9 The employees were transients
working during the summer tourist season at a summer resort. 4 °
The union had made repeated attempts to reach the employees
137 Other, more realistic, situations suggest themselves. Would speaking on a street
corner to pedestrians entering a mall be as effective a means of communication as giving those
pedestrians handbills once they entered the mall? Presumably, under a comparative-effective-
ness standard, batteries of social psychologists would descend on the courts ready to prove that
reading is better than hearing, or vice versa.
138 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).




away from work with little success. 141 These efforts were "ineffec-
tive"'142 since it was "impossible to distinguish between [resort] guests
and employees.' 43 The employees had no telephones. 44 Because of
staggered working hours the employees as a group could not be
reached by radio advertisements. 45 Under these circumstances, the
court found that the union had no alternative save entry upon the
property to reach the workers, and thus granted access. 146 Although
other courts in "resort" cases have not granted access to organizers,
all the courts that have considered the issue have based their denial
of access on the failure of proof by the union that alternative av-
enues of communication had been tried and had failed.
147
Although the burden of showing a lack of adequate alternatives
is difficult, it can be met. 48 It would seem that the migrant-camp
situation is one in which organizers could meet their burden of
proof. Like the employees in Grossinger's, most migrants have no
telephone149 nor easy access to radio or television.15 0 In addition,
since most migrants are Spanish-speaking' 5' and many migrants are






148 Id. at 30.
147 See NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971) (access denied because
union made no showing of attempted use of alternatives before seeking access order); NLRB
v. Kutsher's Hotel, 427 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1970) (facts showed that "reasonable" efforts by
union to reach employees by alternative means had not been made).
148 Cf NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) (granting
union organizer access to isolated lumber camp). This case arose before the decision in
Babcock-Wilcox, so its viability as precedent is somewhat in doubt.
149 See Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 76 (5th Cir. 1973) (camp had no
telephone); Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (D. Conn. 1974) (camp had only pay
telephones).
150 See FIEDLAND & NaTuKN 219. Although many camps have one community television,
the migrants lack the individual access to television of most Americans. Moreover, since only
one station can be viewed at a time, outsiders would be forced to either guess the viewing
habits of the migrants, or undertake costly advertising on all channels.
1"I The number of Spanish-speaking Americans in the migrant labor force varies by
region, with Mexican-Americans predominant in California and Texas. Migrants in the South
include a large number of blacks. See FRIEDLAND & NELKIN 195-205. In the Northeast,
particularly in the area from New Jersey west to Michigan, large numbers of migrants are
Puerto Ricans. For instance, the union involved in Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas v.
Green Giant, Inc., 518 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1975), and in Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D.
Conn. 1974), was comprised primarily of Puerto Ricans.
1512 While statistics on illiteracy are not available for migrants as a group, some indication
of the extent of illiteracy among migrants can be gleaned by examining the illiteracy figures
for Spanish-speaking Americans in the Southwestern United States, a group from which many
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advertisements would be difficult and probably futile.' 53 It has been
shown that few migrants leave camps to go into towns. 154 Even if
migrants did frequent towns, it would be difficult for organizers to
distinguish migrant from nonmigrant Hispanic-Americans. 155 This
difficulty in identifying the target group of employees off the em-
ployer's premises was a factor leading to the granting of access in
Grossinger's.'56 Thus, even under the strict standards of Babcock-
Wilcox and Lloyd it would seem that those seeking to enter migrant
camps could show the complete lack of alternative means of com-
munication short of entry into the camp. In such a situation, Lloyd
clearly dictates that the free-speech rights of those seeking entry
outweigh the property interest of the camp owner and that, there-
fore, an order granting access is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Courts have offered at least four rationales to support grants of
access to migrant-labor camps. Courts have used landlord-tenant
law, trespass law, and a "company-town" first amendment approach
to support access to camps. At least one court, however, using the
"tests" for access to private land in free-speech cases advanced by the
Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 's has found that those
seeking access to labor camps must show that they have no adequate
alternative means of communication for reaching their migrant
migrants are drawn. Census figures from 1960 show that 27.6% of Spanish-speaking Ameri-
cans in the Southwest had less than four years of schooling and were thus classified as
"functional illiterates." See L. GREBLER, J. MOORE & R. GUZMAN, THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN
PEOPLE 18 (1970).
153 Those outsiders seeking to reach the migrants would be forced, at a minimum, to
advertise in both English and Spanish. Written materials would have less impact than in the
usual labor-organizing situation because of the illiteracy of many of the migrants. Even if radio
and television were used to reach the migrants, few would get an opportunity to hear and see
such advertisements.
"" The fear the migrants have of townspeople, and the reasons for that fear, were
described by Friedland and Nelkin:
[Clamps are physically isolated from population centers. But even more significant is
the social isolation that is a product of [the migrant's fears of the local community.
. .. Their appearance... serves to reinforce community stereotypes and perpetuates
their isolation.
FRIEDLAND & NFLKIN 47-48.
155 Migrants in the Southwest are Mexican-Americans in an area already heavily popu-
lated by Mexican-Americans. This increases the difficulty of identifying migrants once they
manage to reach a town. Even when the migrants are readily identifiable in a town, their fear
of outsiders and of town life in general would make it extremely difficult for outsiders to
contact them while in town.
156 NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1967).
257 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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audience before access will be granted. This Note argues that the
Lloyd approach to the problem of access is a clearly preferable
ground for decision in access cases. In most situations, those seeking
entry to migrant camps can meet the tests laid down by the Lloyd
Court and can thus gain access to the camps.
David R. Keyser
